DORA makes ICT supplier assurance a governance priority. Reliable evidence and practitioner judgement support accountable financial-sector risk decisions.

If you provide cloud infrastructure, core banking software, payment processing, market data or managed cybersecurity to European banks and insurers, DORA makes third-party assurance a significant relationship risk and opportunity.
Article 28(1) requires financial entities to manage ICT third-party risk within their ICT risk management framework. Those financial entities remain responsible for their obligations when they use ICT providers. Your role is to supply relevant evidence and fulfil the contractual obligations that support their decisions.
A SOC 2 report or ISO 27001 certificate can contribute useful evidence. It does not, by itself, establish that a particular service arrangement meets DORA requirements. The customer's assessment must consider the service, its criticality, dependencies, contractual safeguards and relevant risks.
For ICT providers, the practical question is whether evidence is current, relevant to the customer's use of the service, and clear about limitations. Monitoring and evidence collection help, but practitioner judgement and accountable governance remain necessary.
The following distinguishes financial-entity accountability from the provider's supporting role. Requirements depend on the service arrangement and whether it supports a critical or important function.
| DORA provision | Relevant evidence and safeguards | Accountability |
|---|---|---|
| Articles 28(4) and 29: due diligence and concentration risk | Service dependencies, substitutability and subcontracting information | Financial entity assesses; provider supplies relevant information |
| Article 28(3): register of information | Accurate information on ICT service contractual arrangements | Financial entity maintains the register; provider supports it |
| Article 30: contractual safeguards | Data access and return, service levels, audit rights and exit arrangements as applicable | Rights and obligations allocated in the written contract |
| Articles 19 and 30(2)(f), 30(3)(b): incidents and provider support | Incident assistance and applicable contractual notification and reporting arrangements | Financial entity reports major incidents to its competent authority; provider fulfils applicable contractual duties |
| Articles 26, 27 and 30(3)(d): threat-led penetration testing | Participation and cooperation where applicable | Financial entity's testing obligations and provider's contractual participation |
Article 41 concerns conditions for oversight activities. It is not the incident-reporting provision and does not impose a universal four-hour provider-to-client notification deadline. The oversight framework for designated critical ICT providers is distinct from the contractual obligations relevant to other ICT providers.
One approach treats assurance as a document exchange. The other connects evidence to the customer's actual service relationship, records gaps and follows up on material changes.
Decision Intelligence supports the second approach: combine technology and relevant evidence with practitioner judgement, documented reasoning and accountable decisions. Automated collection can reduce repetitive work, but an automated score or evidence feed cannot settle whether a customer should accept a particular risk.
Clear, reusable evidence can help customers assess a provider and discuss contractual safeguards. A disciplined assurance process can also make gaps, remediation responsibilities and escalation routes easier to understand.
These are practical aims, not measured promises of faster deals, higher contract prices or guaranteed customer retention. Commercial outcomes depend on the customer, service, evidence quality and procurement process.
DORA has applied since 17 January 2025. Providers should understand which customer arrangements support critical or important functions and prepare appropriate evidence and contractual support. Designation as a critical ICT provider creates a separate oversight context; it is not a prerequisite for a customer to assess its supplier risk.
The article's central point remains: third-party assurance can create significant risk and opportunity for ICT providers serving financial entities. The useful question is whether the customer has sufficient relevant evidence to make and defend its decision, including unresolved gaps and who is accountable for them.
TPSaaS's Decision Intelligence framing brings evidence, practitioner judgement and accountable governance together. It does not certify a provider as “DORA-safe” or guarantee compliance.
Use the existing DORA Checklist as a starting point, or book 15 minutes with our team to discuss the evidence needed for your customer relationships.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2554: official DORA text, Articles 19, 26–31, 41 and 64. Legal requirements, contractual obligations and TPSaaS's practical interpretation are distinguished above.
Updated .